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Recent statistics1 show that roughly 90% of the traded goods were moved by sea through 
the operation of over 50.000 vessels, contributing for over $ 380 billion to the global econ-
omy and employing over 1.2 million of people. The evolution of the contracts that regulate 
the legal relationships in the business, it is easy to imagine, had and still has a great influ-
ence not only on the subjects who took part to the agreement, but also on a vast number of 
people. This led to the necessity of balancing and compressing the freedom of contracting, 
typical of private law, in the light of the public interests directly or indirectly affected by 
them.  
The parties involved in a contract of carriage are mainly two: the carrier and the shipper. 
Their duties are normally disciplined by the contract which represent the expression of their 
wills, despite nowadays the use of standard agreements has grown to become the normal 
choice, leaving the role of the parties a very marginal position in the decisional process. 
Other than the mentioned contractual parties, there is a multitude of other subjects involved 
in the transportation of goods by sea: the carrier, ça va sans dire, cannot perform the work 
alone and he obviously will recruit and rely on other people, his employees or other work-
ers hired for specific scopes.  
Many different issues and questions arise from this: do rights and duty in the agreement 
extend to those subjects? If that is to some extent understandable and reasonable for the 
parties’ employees who are in fact chosen or act under the control of their employer, the 
same cannot be said for the parties who are third to a contract and who never have been 
party to it. Multiple examples can be made such as port pilots or stevedores: these subjects 
perform work in direct service of the ship and the cargo, therefore in the interest of the con-
tractual parties, but are no part of the agreement. How should they be regarded as? Their 
legal state and position have been changing through the last century mainly influenced by 
                                                 
 
1 Kraska J., Pedrozo R., International Maritime Security Law, 2013. P.125 
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domestic legislation and international conventions.   
 
1.1 Scope, Method and Structure of the Thesis 
 
The aim of this thesis is to examine the evolution of liability rules and the consequential 
changing approach to the position of parties third to the contract of carriage, hired by the 
carrier, and whom he is vicariously liable for. This work analyses and describes the 
relevant  instruments provided by the international conventional sources with a partuicular 
focus on the ones that regulate the basis of the carrier liability and his defences against it. 
Said analysis is performed in a comparative way in order to fully understand the multiple 
changes and remedies brought to the table by the international conventions and the private 
operators’ practice in the market Especially the latters have, through the creation of ad hoc 
contractual terms, indeed heavilly influenced the discipline of vicarious liability.  
The thesis is structured in five chapters followed by the conlcuding remarks. After this 
brief introduction, in the second chapter, the first step consists in giving a necessary histor-
ical introduction of the economic and legal conditions of the market before the introduction 
of internationally bounding regulation in order to explain what needs moved the Maritime 
Committee to the creation of said set of rules. An analysis of the International Convention 
of the unification of certain rules of law relating to bills of lading (also known as Hague 
Rules) and the following protocols (which turned it into what is commonly known as 
Hague-Visby Rules) is then offered. The study focuses on the not-amendable duties im-
posed on the carrier and on the innovative exclusion of liability conditions brought about 
by the convention. The second part of this chapter is dedicated to the solutions created by 
the subjects involved in the maritime transportation business, particularly the creation of ad 
hoc contractual terms, in order to solve the technical limits of the Hague-Visby Rules. 
More specifically the following topics are discussed: the creation of the so-called Himalaya 
Clause, the controversy it raised, its acceptance and origins in the English common law 
system, and finally its interaction with the international conventional sources of law. 
The third chapter introduces the Hamburg Rules, the economic reasons behind its introduc-
tions and the different changes to the structure of carrier’s liability such as the abolishment 
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of certain traditional exoneration causes. The second part of this chapter presents the 
“Scandinavian solution” with a particular focus on the Norwegian Maritime Code showing 
how the Hamburg Rules, despite not having been ratified by the Nordic States2, still have 
influenced their legislative choices on the matter.  
The fourth chapter presents a brief overview of the United Nation Convention on Contracts 
for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea (commonly referred as 
Rotterdam Rules) is given. Despite the fact it has been ratified by only three countries 
among the very few that signed it, the importance of this conventional set of rules is re-
markable. It represents the first attempt of creating a worldwide regulation on the matter of 
carriage of goods performed in different parts/means of transport, and a solid attempt to 
resolve the various issues emerged from the technical limits of its predecessors.  
















                                                 
 
2 Norway, Finland, Sweden and Denmark are referred to as “Nordic States” 
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2 The avent of the first International regulation and the market 
solutions to liability issues raising in contracts of maritime 
carriage of goods: the Hague-Visby Rules and the Himalaya 
clause. 
 
During the transport of goods at sea, there are many different subjects involved in the oper-
ations. Most of them are unlikely to be part of the contract of carriage that disciplines the 
performance of the service (e.g. pilots or stevedores), but their conduct can expose them to 
liability, which in most of cases, they cannot be economically able to deal with, especially 
considering they would normally have no access to the defences granted to their employer. 
This therefore, constitutes an issue for both the parties of the contract: for the cargo inter-
ests, as they would unlikely get their credit satisfied, for the carrier, because not protecting 
the servants from the risk of unlimited claims would require the stipulation of highly ex-
pensive insurance policies, which would likely have a negative impact on the business cost.  
In the maritime industry the of bill of lading is a document issued by a carrier which con-
tains details, such as number or quality, of a shipment of goods and gives title of that cargo 
to a specified party. Its use has been a common practice since the ancient Romans time, the 
document was invented to serve for the shipper as both receipt and as evidence of a certain 
quantity and quality of the goods loaded on the vessel3, but its use has deeply changed 
through the centuries. Nowadays, it is not just used as mere receipt, but also as "document 
of title" that can be negotiated, and possibly sold, to an undetermined number of new hold-
ers, also known as endorsees.    
The document used to present the conditions established by the parties for the performance 
of the contract of carriage but, by the end of the 19th century and the consequent increasing 
of the volume and importance of the maritime shipping market, they faced legal relevant 
changes. The bills of lading became very complex as different legal prescriptions were in-
troduced into them: the average user involved in the shipping business was not able to cope 
                                                 
 
3 H. J. Bull, Scandinavian maritime law, The Norwegian Prospective 3rd Ed. 2011, P. 276 
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with the language and the complexity anymore as they turned into real contracts. During 
this period, civil law regulations set the parties entirely free to stipulate agreements to regu-
late their wills but, for obvious reason, the big operators in the market had a dominant posi-
tion advantage: shipowners increased then their level of protection from liabilities by intro-
ducing different kinds of limitation and exclusion of liability clauses. Only one side of the 
contractual relationship had this advantage and soon enough Cargo Owners were not able 
to opposing them. The United States were at the time holding the dominant position among 
Cargo Holders interests4: Courts of law tried to defend them against "negligence clauses" 
but the expedient to overcome this used by European carriers, pretty effective and relative-
ly simple, merely consisted on designating English law the law of choice through inserting 
a specific clause in the bill of lading. An internationally orchestrated solution was then felt 
necessary: in 1912, the United States Maritime Law Association suggested to the Interna-
tional Maritime Committee5 the necessity of an international frame of regulation6. The first 
step though was only taken in 1921 when the Committee presented and proposed a set of 
rules in a conference at Hague, thereby creating the embryonal form of what are now 
commonly known as the Hague Rules. Other important maritime States at the time inter-
vened and cooperated: the Rules needed to be introduced and harmonised with the various 
domestic legislations in order to produce effective results. The most important contribution 
came from English Empire, which tried to protect the interests of its fleets that held then a 
consistent share of the market7: the more States aligned with the Rules through their adop-
tion, the less possible disadvantages for the British shipowners. It was finally in 1924 that 
the Rules were inserted into an International Convention8 and signed in Brussels, leaving to 
the signatory States the last step to bring them into force. It is important to notice that, de-
spite the revolutionary and important role that they played, the Rules showed different is-
                                                 
 
4 Ibidem, P. 277 
5 Also known in French as Comite Maritime International, it consists in a private organization of main actors 
of the maritime market with the scope of harmonizing worldwide binding maritime rules.  
6 A. Rodriguez Palacios, A comparative analysis of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules and the Hamburg Rules, 
1990. P. 2   
7 Ibidem, P. 4 
8 International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law relating to Bills of Lading and Proto-
col of Signature. Brussels, 1924.  
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sues: the Committee brought different amendments resulting in 1968 in what is now widely 
known as Hague-Visby Rules.  
The market practice also contributed to bring remarkable solutions to the table: even 
though it did not solve every issue, it significantly to valued and protected the positions of 
the subjects involved.  
 
2.1 The Hague/Hague-Visby Rules: the first conventional set of international rules 
 
The Hague rules were not a product of English proposals but originated, and partially com-
promised with, from the American Harter Act of 1893. It indeed consisted in a compromise 
between the opposite interests of protection from any form of liabilities for the carrier on 
one hand, and those who had desire of establish a limit basing it on the negligent perfor-
mance of the contract on the other. Many have considered this statute, because of its im-
portance, “one of the most remarkable statues ever enacted in the field of shipping law”9. 
The Hague Rules did not differentiate from English common law when approaching the 
matter: the principle, by which the carrier cannot claim any exemption or limitation in case 
of negligent conduct, has been established in many cases before. The concept of negligence 
was bound to any violation of express contractual terms10 and the definition of “terms” and, 
following that, a firm prohibition to exclusion of liability clauses operating in case of neg-
ligence, was established11.  
The Rules, as emended by the Visby protocol in 1968, established a set of norms to disci-
                                                 
 
9 A. Rodriguez Palacios, Op. cit., P. 6 
10 In Hamilton Fraser & Co v Pandorf & Co (1887), Lord Halsbury stated: “In the class of contract where the 
shipowner’s negligence or misconduct prevents perils of the sea being relied upon, it is not that perils of the 
sea are different […] because in those cases an additional term exists in the contract, which makes the negli-
gence of the shipowner, or of those whom he is responsible, a material element”.  
11 In Smith Hogg & Co v Black Sea & Baltic General Insurance Co Ltd, Lord Wright stated: “The shipowner 
will in absence of valid and sufficient exceptions be liable for a loss occasioned by negligence. Apart from 
express exceptions, the carrier’s contract is to deliver the goods safely. But when the practice of having ex-
press exceptions limiting that obligation became common, it was laid down that there were fundamental obli-
gations, which were not affected by the specific exceptions, unless that was made clear by express words. 
Thus an exception of peril of the sea does not qualify the duty to furnish a seaworthy ship or to carry the 
goods without negligence”.  
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pline the Carrier’s duties and, therefore, constitute the basis for his liability. They can be 
briefly summarized as follow: duty of provide and maintain a vessel in condition of sea-
worthiness, duty to no deviate from the route established by the parties and, last but not 
least, duty to take care of the cargo12.  
In addition, being the convention meant to rule contracts with an issued bill of lading, the 
Rules, obviously, also establish a duty on the carrier to issue the document13.  
It is important to notice that the provisions expressly require the carrier to act diligently14 
which obviously caused a consistent number of interpretation by different Courts of law. 
The parameter has to be analysed with a bendy mindset, basing the interpretation on the 
concrete facts, the different level of knowledge/technology available at the time and any 
other factor that might have had an influence on the case15.  
2.1.1 The Carrier’s main duties established by the Hague-Visby Rules 
 
In the next paragraphs, we will briefly go through the duties established by the Hague-
Visby Rules.  
 
2.1.1.1 The duty to provide a Seaworthy ship 
 
The first prescription of art. III of the Rules requires the Carrier to provide a seaworthy ship 
for the performance of the contract. The meaning of seaworthiness is described in English 
common law as follow: “The vessel must have that degree of fitness which an ordinary 
careful and prudent owner would require his vessel to have at the commencement of her 
voyage having regard to all the probable circumstances of it […]“16. It is important to no-
                                                 
 
12 See the Hague-Visby Rules, art. III, 1-2: “The carrier shall be bound before and at the beginning of the 
voyage to exercise due diligence to […]”. 
13 Art. III (3) states: “the shipper can demand the carrier to issue a bill of lading showing the leading marks, 
the quantity of the goods and apparent order and condition of the goods”. 
14 See Supra Note 12 
15 J. Richardson, The Hague and Hague-Visby Rules, Lloyd's Practical Shipping Guides,4th Ed, 1998. P. 19 
16 See Channel J. opinion, in Mc Fadden v Blue Star Line (1905). 
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tice that the qualities of the ship are to be considered with specific regard of the cargo and 
the route established by the contract of carriage. This is not limited to the material equip-
ment but it extends to the manning of the ship if specific competences are required by the 
case. It follows that specific necessary arrangement might consist in something that goes 
beyond the general accepted qualities of a ship17.    
With regard of the cargo, we might then speak of cargoworthiness: the bottom line is that 
the ship has to be equipped with the proper gear to grant that the goods arrive safely and 
with their qualities unaltered to the port of destination. As far as the route of the trip is con-
cerned, the weather and possible particular perils must come into consideration.   
The importance of such prescription is clear when we analyse the legal systems that pre-
ceded the Rules. Before then, the parties were free to agree specific clauses in order to dis-
miss liability even in case of unseaworthiness which, given the preponderant position of the 
Shipping industry, represented a problem for cargo interests, often forced to accept said 
conditions.  
The compromise brought by the Rules is self-evident: between the clauses of liability ex-
emption and the rule of absolute liability for unseaworthiness, the solution has been the 
introduction of a rule of absolute unseaworthiness based on the carrier’s negligence. It fol-
lows that the mere condition of the vessel is not sufficient to trigger the liability, it is also 
necessary that the carrier acted negligently while performing his duties. No limit is estab-
lished for contractual clauses that imply duties that are more stringent for the carrier.  
Another issue raised by the practice of the market consist on the so-called vicarious liabil-
ity: it refers to the liability of the carrier for the work performed by third people in service 
of the ship. Many are the possible examples: the agents, the master of the ship or the repair 
yard workers. In English common law, the solution came in 1961 with the Muncaster Cas-
tle case18. In the case de quo, the cargo had been damaged by the penetration of seawater 
due to a faulty inspection manhole improperly fastened by repair yard worker. The person-
nel on board could not possibly discover the faulty condition; the question was therefore 
                                                 
 
17 A. H. Kassem, The Legal Aspects of Seaworthiness: Current Law and Development, 2006. P.24.  
18 Riverstone Meat Co.Pty. Ltd. V. Lancashire Shipping Co (1961). See H. J. Bull, Op Cit. P. 183 
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whether the carrier should be held liable for the damage occurred. The answer of the House 
of Lords was affirmative. It follows that the fact the carrier delegates his duty to a third 
party does not free him from any possible liability arising. Lastly, it is worth notice that 
according to the Hague-Visby Rules, the duty to make a vessel seaworthy ends at the start 
of the voyage. It follows that conditions arose after the commencement do not lead to lia-
bility for the carrier19.  
 
2.1.1.2 The duty to not operate Deviations 
 
As far as the duty of not operating deviations, it must be noticed that in common shipping 
practice, the route to be followed is not specified in the contract. The information included 
in the agreement usually include the port of loading/departure and the one of discharg-
ing/destination. The bottom line, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, is that the route to 
be followed is the one between the two ports20 established in the contract. Deviations are 
seen with serious regards especially in common law systems: they may lead the carrier to 
being unable to limit or exclude liability. The reason behind this position lay on the extra 
and not pondered risks to which the cargo is exposed. The owner could not possibly take 
them into account and therefore evaluating the convenience of the contract or proper 
measures to prevent the damage from occurring21. The Rules do not explicitly forbid devia-
tions, but the wording of art. IV (4)22 clearly establish that reasonable deviations are al-
lowed and do not constitute a breach of the rule: it self-implies that any other deviation 
must be considered as such.  
 
                                                 
 
19 R. Force, A comparison of the Hague, Hague-Visby, and Hamburg rules: Much Ado About?, in Tulane Law 
Review, vol. 70,1996. P. 2063, 
20 J.F. Wilson, Carriage of Goods by Sea, 7th Ed.,,2010. P. 232 
21 H. J. Bull, Op Cit., P. 315 
22 Hague-Visby Rules, Art. 4 (4) states: “Any deviation in saving or attempting to save life or property at sea 
or any reasonable deviation shall not be deemed to be an infringement or breach of these Rules or of the con-
tract of carriage, and the carrier shall not be liable for any loss or damage resulting therefrom”. 
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2.1.1.3 The duty of Good Care of the cargo transported 
 
Along with the other duties, the carrier has a duty of care of the cargo23. Few things can be 
said about the wording chosen. Whilst the word “carefully” can be interpreted with the 
general meaning of an action performed with care, the second word, “properly” adds a cer-
tain degree of skill, and expertise, to the quality required for the performance itself24. Other 
part of the doctrine refused this interpretation and stood by the opinion that no particular 
difference or meaning is intended by the authors of the Rules by the use of the two different 
words25. The duty, due to its intrinsic nature, persists as long as the carrier is in physical 
possession of the goods to be transported: it follows that it starts when loaded on board and 
ends at the moment of delivery to the consignee.   
The Rules do not discipline the damage arising from delay in delivery of the goods but, if 
the physical damage suffered is a consequence of it, it can be assumed that it can be recov-
ered as the delay constituted a breach of “proper and careful” handling of the cargo. For 
example, if the goods are characterized by short durability, delivering them after the agreed 
time, therefore damaging them, cannot be judging as “proper” or “careful” acting by the 
carrier.  It must finally be added that any breach of the duty of good care cannot be excused 
by the carrier by arguing that the fault lays on a third party, a contractor, who performed 
work in his service26.  
 
2.1.2 Exclusion and Limitation of liability rights of the Carrier 
 
Firstly, it is very important to highlight that, along with the duties described above, the 
                                                 
 
23 Hague-Visby rules, Art. III (2) states: “[…] the carrier shall properly and carefully load, handle, stow, car-
ry, keep, care for, and discharge the goods carried”. 
24 P. Delebecque, Obligations of the Carrier, in The Rotterdam Rules: Commentary to the United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly By Sea, 2010. P. 83. In his 
reasoning, the author highlights the necessity of a sound system for the performance required by the contract. 
25 See, among the others, J. Richardson, Op Cit. P. 19 
26 W. Tetley, Properly carry, keep and care for Cargo - art. 3(2) of the Hague/Visby Rules, 2001. Chapter 
V. Available at http://www.mcgill.ca/maritimelaw/maritime-admiralty/art3-2 , last accessed on 
31/10/2015. 
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Rules set a specific prohibition for the parties to reach an agreement capable of overcoming 
the duties prescribed. The wording is pretty clear: “Any clause, covenant, or agreement in a 
contract of carriage relieving the carrier or the ship from liability for loss or damage to, or 
in connection with, goods arising from negligence, fault, or failure in the duties and 
obligations provided in this article or lessening such liability otherwise than as provided in 
these Rules, shall be null and void and of no effect”27.   
As part of a compromise between the cargo owners and the liners interests, the Rules also 
establish certain causes of exemption of liability28, precisely 17, which are commonly re-
ferred as “expected perils”: they include acts of war, acts of God, riots or civil commotions 
and other unpredictable and unavoidable possible situations that do not depend on the car-
rier’s conduct. The catalogue of exemptions, which is the result of the historical develop-
ment of shipping practice, protects the carrier from possible treats that have always repre-
sented a danger for maritime expeditions. The perils at sea are multiple and historical evo-
lution of the market practices has brought these different kinds of immunities to the table in 
order to compensate and, to a certain extent, protect the carrier from risks that would make 
performing his tasks unreasonably burdensome. The convention simply followed these 
practices and allowed shielded the carrier position.  
We will now proceed to briefly analyse the two exemptions disciplined by the letter A and 
be of art. IV (2) of the Hague-Visby Rules.   
 
2.1.2.1 The Nautical Fault and Management of the Ship exemption 
 
The letter A of art. IV (2) establishes that liability is excluded for the carrier or the ship in 
case of “Act, neglect, or default of the master, mariner, pilot, or the servants of the carrier 
in the navigation or in the management of the ship”. What is the meaning of “navigation”? 
An extensive jurisprudence led to consider any manoeuvre and steering of the vessel29: this 
                                                 
 
27 Hague-Visby Rules, Art. III (8) 
28 Hague-Visby Rules, Art IV (2) from let. A to let. Q  
29 H. J. Bull, Op Cit., P. 293 
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include the use of lanterns and other navigational equipment. Another very important as-
pect is the protection of the carrier for acts committed by people performing work in ser-
vice of the ship: the Rules clearly indicate the carrier’s employees (mariner, master or serv-
ants) but also the pilot, a person who is usually working for the port authority. It appears 
logical that, despite being very unlikely in practice, the exclusion does not operate for er-
rors committed by the carrier in person as not mentioned in the wording.    
As far as “management of the ship” is concerned, the concept reunites many different activ-
ities connected with the operation of the vessel. It is not limited to the mere navigational 
operations, but it also has regards for those activities that influence the ship’s conditions 
and its equipment30. This does not include any activity related to the good care of the cargo 
transported: any breach of the duty described above will result in liability for the carrier. In 
case the error involves consequences for both the ship and the cargo, the solution will have 
to be decided on a case-by-case basis having particular care for the events31: the goal is 
determine whether the conduct had effect on the ship and consequentially on the cargo or 
directly and primarily on the cargo.  
 
2.1.2.2 The Fire damage exemption 
 
As far as letter B is concerned, it provides the carrier with protection for loss and damages 
caused by fire “unless caused by the actual fault or privity of the carrier”. It follows that 
any accident caused directly by the carrier’s personal negligence does not allow the benefit 
of the exemption. It also follows that any measure direct to extinguish the fire that might 
accidentally cause damage to the goods transported, do not trigger liability either unless 
poorly and recklessly executed32.    
                                                 
 
30 Ibidem 
31 J. Richardson, Op Cit., P. 33 
32 Ibidem. P. 34 
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2.1.3 Concluding Remarks 
 
Practice in the shipping industry clearly showed how the contractual carrier is rarely in-
volved on the actual performance of the contract. His duty and almost every single act to-
ward the result is indeed undertaken by a various number of employees: the master, the 
crew or his agents both on board and ashore. It follows that is normally one of them, 
through misacting, to lead to triggering of liability33. The channelling of liability toward the 
carrier, what we call vicarious liability, is the only possible remedy. On top of that, we 
need to consider the results of the conducts of those who perform a work in service of the 
ship, so called third parties to the contract: shipyard workers, stevedores and pilots to name 
a few examples. These subjects have been left in some kind of limbo by the Hague rules: 
not being part of the contract means they cannot benefit from extensions of protections of 
liability offered to the carrier and his personnel. Their interests have not been taken into 
account and, as a result, said parties resulted deprived of any defence, which resulted into 
tortious lawsuits against them. A solution was necessary and the market practice has the 
merit of having brought a remarkable one to the table, the creation of specific contractual 
clauses that, even though did not solve every issue, contributed significantly to value and 
protect the positions of the subjects involved in the carriage of goods. 
 
2.2 The Himalaya Clause: an innovative change on the field of third parties 
and vicarious liability systems. 
 
The Himalaya clause consists in a highly controversial contractual term that has raised a 
vast number of discussions ever since its very creation. As discussed above, during the ac-
tual transportation of goods at sea, most of the subjects involved in the performance of con-
tractual obligations are unlikely parties of the contract of carriage. This leaves them ex-
posed to liability without the benefit of limitation or exclusions rights. The market practice 
                                                 
 
33 J. H. Bull, Op Cit., P. 169 
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has the merit of having brought a remarkable solution to the table: even though it did not 
solve every issue, it contributed significantly to value and protect the positions of the sub-
jects involved. In is normally inserted in a carter party or in a bill of lading and its effect is 
to extend the carrier protections to parties who did not take part to the contract and who, 
through negligent conduct while performing directly or indirectly their obligations con-
nected to the carriage of goods, might cause damages or losses to the cargo.  
 
2.2.1 Main Issues Raised by the use Himalaya clauses in English Common law 
legal systems 
 
The main issue raising from the introduction of the Himalaya clause in common law sys-
tems is due to the absence of the principle of “stipulation for another”34 in such legal tradi-
tions. Therefore, can a person, which has never been part of a specific contract, benefit 
from its terms? The inclusion of Himalaya clauses to a bill of lading extends the terms’ 
benefits granted to the contractual carrier, such as the limitation and exclusion of liability 
disciplined by the Hague-Visby Rules, to these subjects.  
to parties who are third to the contract of carriage (e.g. stevedores or terminal operators). 
What emerges from a reading of the modern version of the clause35 is an agreement be-
tween the two contractual parts, the carrier and the shipper, that establishes complete pro-
tection from “any liability whatsoever” to an undefined number of subjects involved (any-
one, “including every independent contractor from time to time employed by the carrier”).  
It is worth mentioning that said protection is limited to any loss “[…] arising or resulting 
directly or indirectly from any act […] while acting or in connection with his employment”. 
Every protection, meaning “[…] exemption, limitation, condition and liberty herein con-
tained and every right, exemption from liability, defence and immunity of whatsoever na-
ture applicable to the carrier [...]”, is extended “[…] to protect every such servant or 
                                                 
 
34 W. Tetley, The Himalaya Clause – Revisited, 2003. P. 3 
35 This is the version that can be found in New Zealand Shipping Co. Ltd. v. A. M. Satterthwaite & Co. Ltd 
(1974), also known as The Eurymedon. 
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agent of the carrier […]”.   
A very extensive literature on the matter can be found. For reason of simplicity, and given 
the aim of this work, it is not possible here to debate extensively about privity of contract 
discipline in common law. It is sufficient to mention that in English Law, no enforcement 
of a contract is granted to parties who have not provided consideration to it. It follows that 
a third party to a contract may not enforce the benefits received by a contract stipulated by 
others36.  
We will then limit the analysis to a brief historical introduction of the Himalaya clause, its 
acceptance in English law and its relationship with the protections disciplined by the inter-
national sources described in the previous chapter.   
 
2.2.2 The historical origins of the Himalaya Clause 
 
The origin of the Himalaya clause deeps its roots in an English Court of Appeal case of 
1954, Adler v Dickson. The facts can be briefly described as follow: during the performing 
of a contract of carriage of passengers an accident happened, a gangway fell down injuring 
Mrs. Adler who was then traveling on board of the ship. The ticket she bought explicitly 
contained a non-responsibility clause that exempted the carrier entirely for the damage she 
suffered. She then decided to sue the master of the ship, Mr. Dickson, and his senior crew-
member in charge for the components of the hull.  
The Court established then one important principle: in contracts involving the carriage of 
goods as well as people, the contractual carrier can agree liability exemptions other than for 
himself, also for those who he employed to carry out the performance established by the 
contract. The stipulation can be either express or implied. In the case de quo though, it was 
held by the court that the contract did not extend any of the rights to the defendants as no 
stipulation could be revealed: this consequentially led to exclude any benefits for the carri-
                                                 
 
36 For a more extensive analysis of Privity of Contract in English law, see: M. Chen-Wishart, Contract Law, 
2012. P. 166 
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er’s employees.   
Right after the decision, the creation and use of Himalaya clauses in bills of lading started 
to spread. In 1955, the technique was adopted by the Hague Protocol37 that modified, in the 
field of aviation law, the Warsaw Convention of 1929. Its first appearance on the maritime 
field coincided with the Visby Protocol of 1968 which modified the Hague Rules through 
the introduction of art. 4-bis (2) and (3). It is important to observe that the Himalaya clause 
shields the subjects involved from any kind of liability, which includes both contractual 
and tortious, thus eliminating, in this field only, the differences between the two. Before 
this change, despite the difficulties brought about by the tortious liability system38, the 
choice was stimulated by the absence or lower limitations of the damage recoverable. Be-
ing the protections extended equally, the result has been the loss of incentive for the cargo 
owner to sue third parties through extra-contractual actions.  
 
2.2.3 The Acceptance of the Clause in English Law: a long due change to the 
privity of contract principle 
 
The innovative decision in the United Kingdom for the acceptance of the Himalaya clause 
can be traced back to a decision of the Privy Council in 197439. The facts of the case in-
volved the shipping of a drilling machinery from Liverpool to Wellington, New Zealand. 
The bill of lading contained a specific clause that limited the liability of the carrier and that 
such protection is extended to his servants, agents and independent contractor involved in 
the performance of the contract. The problem arose when the stevedores damaged the ma-
                                                 
 
37 Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage 
by Air, Signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929, Done at The Hague On 28 September 1955 
38 Briefly: any action in tort requires the claimant to prove the damage existence and its nexus between a 
faulty conduct of the defendant. On the other hand, in contractual claims, all the claimant is required to prove 
is the existence of the damage and its occurrence during the time the cargo was under the carrier custody. The 
burden of proof is then reverted to the defendant who has to prove he acted diligently to prevent any damage 
to the cargo transported. 
39 Supra note 35 
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chinery during the discharging operation. They obviously claimed protection on the basis 
of the clause inserted in the bills of lading.  
The Privy Council, in the person of Lord Wilberforce, held that the elements known as 
“Lord Reid test”40 were present in the case and, therefore, the stevedores were to be con-
sidered protected by the clause.   
In 1980, another very important case41 concerning the shipment of razor blades from Cana-
da to Australia put the clause under exam. After the discharge was performed, the cargo 
was delivered to the wrong person who did not retrieved it. The consignee sued the compa-
ny for the negligent acting and the defendant replied by relying on the Himalaya clause. 
The consignee rebutted that, even if the protections were to be expanded to the stevedores, 
the immunity clause does not protect for liability for loss of cargo once it has been dis-
charged from the ship. The Privy Council, in the person of Lord Wilberforce, disagreed and 
held that the immunities extend over the period following the discharge as, according to 
common practice on the field, the contract of carriage ends when the goods are delivered to 
the consignee. The outcome is the protection of the stevedores by the same exemption of 
liability granted to the carrier and contained in the bill of lading.    
It is worth noticing that “the practicality of the clause depends on the practicality of the 
contractual relationship at the moment the damage arose”42. Following case law confirmed 
this view. For instance, few year later on a case43 concerning the shipping of a container of 
motorcycles, the stevedores could not invoke the liability protection from the bill of lading. 
The cargo was stored in a container park while awaiting the vessel and was then damaged 
by an employee of Mersey Docks & Harbour Co. The Court deemed the contract as “not in 
                                                 
 
40 Said rule has been established in a previous case, Scruttons Ltd v Midland Silicones Ltd (1961). The im-
portance of such case, other than originating from the House of Lords, is due to the fact it overcomes the 
privity rule creating an exception for employees seeking for protection in their employer’s contract. In the 
judgment Lord Reid stated that in order to trigger the exception, four elements were necessary: 1) The third 
parties must be clearly protected by the contractual clause; 2) The carrier makes clear that while contracting, 
he is also doing so on behalf of the third parties and the result shall apply to them; 3) The carrier has been 
given authority to do so (even a late ratification should be considered sufficient); 4) Any difficulty concerning 
consideration must have been overcome.  
41 Port Jackson Stevedoring Pty Ltd v Salmond & Spraggon Australia Pty Ltd (1980), also known as The 
New York Star 
42 A. Antonini, Manuale breve di Diritto della Navigazione, 2008. P. 196 
43 Burke Motors v Mersey Docks (1986) 
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existence” when the damage occurred, therefore the defendant could not rely on the Hima-
laya clause.   
Criticism to the privity rule came from both academics and judges. As far as the first ones 
are concerned, few examples are Jack Beatson44 and Andrew Burrows45. The latest high-
lighted how a change was necessary and the fact it had been “called for” ever since 193746. 
As for the jurisdictional circle, one of the most relevant criticism came from Lord Diplock 
who, in a case from 1983, described the rule as “an anachronistic shortcoming that has for 
many years been regarded as a reproach to English private law”47. Lord Justice Steyn in 
1995 advocated for a change on the rule of privity as it collides with business interests and 
the principles of law. In his reasoning, he analysed the role of law as protector of the parties 
will and, if it true that imposing a duty to someone without his consideration and consent 
would be unreasonable, the same cannot be said for allowing a right as no negative impli-
cation might arise from it48.   
The Law commission of the English Parliament presented a new draft bill in 1991 and 
completed its report in 1996. Three years after, the new law received the Royal assent: the 
Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act was promulgated and came immediately into force. 
The change was huge: a third party was finally allowed to enforce a term of a contract 
where it is expressly provided that he may do so49. Such right is also extended to subjects 
not personally named in the contract but part of a class to whom the benefit has been grant-
                                                 
 
44 J. Batson, Reforming the Law of Contracts for the Benefit of Third Parties: a Second Bite at the Cherry, 45 
CLP 1, 1992. Cited by W. Tetley, Op Cit.,. P.14 and J. Poole, Casebook on Contract Law 12th Edition, 2014, 
P. 488 
45 A. Burrows, The Contracts (Rights of Third Parties Act) 1999 and its implications for commercial con-
tracts, in Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly, 2000.  
46 A. Burrows referrers to the sixth interim report of The Law Revision Committee of 1937, chaired by Lord 
Wright. 
47 Swain v The Law Society (1983) 
48 Darlington Borough Council v Wilshire Northern Ltd (1995). L.J. Steyn stated: “The case for recognizing a 
contract for the benefit of a third party is simple and straightforward. The autonomy of the will of the parties 
should be respected. The law of contract should give effect to reasonable expectations of contracting parties. 
Principle certainly requires that a burden should not be imposed on a third parties without his consent. But 
there is no doctrinal, logical, or policy reason why the law should deny effectiveness to a contract for the 
benefit of a third party where that is the expressed intention of the parties. Moreover, often the parties, and 
particularly third parties, organise their affairs on the faith of the contract”. 
49 Contract (Rights of Third Parties) Act of 1999, Sect. 1(1), Lett. A. 
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ed50. A typical example are stevedores or port pilots. Another fundamental change regard-
ing the use of Himalaya clauses is the one concerning negative rights. These includes ex-
clusion and limitation clauses and could now benefits third parties too51.  
The Act also dedicates an entire section to the exceptions to the right of third parties. Par-
ticularly, a third party to a contract has no right to enforce a beneficial term in case the con-
tract concerns carriage of good by sea52. Such category of contracts is defined by the Act as 
“a contract contained in or evidenced by a bill of lading, sea waybill53 or a corresponding 
electronic transaction”54. The second part also adds to the description any contract “under 
or for the purposes of which there is given an undertaking which is contained in a ship’s 
delivery order or a corresponding electronic transaction”55. By the reading of the text, it 
may seem at first glance that the Himalaya clause would be in fact useless as third parties 
cannot enforce such benefit due to the exceptions contained in the Act. The solution to the 
riddle comes from the reading of the Act’s Explanatory Notes56. About Section 6(5), the 
Act “[…] does not prevent a third party from taking advantage of a term excluding or limit-
ing liability. In particular, this enables clauses which seek to extend an exclusion or limita-
tion of liability of a carrier of goods by sea to servants, agents and independent contractors 
engaged in the loading and unloading process, to be enforced by those servants, agents or 
independent contractors (so called “Himalaya” clauses)”.   
It follows that the theory brought about by Lord Reid is no longer necessary, the Act sim-
plifies the requirements for third parties to enforce beneficial clauses as long as they are 
identified, expressly or referred to by class.   
 
                                                 
 
50 Ibidem, Sect. 1(1), Let. B 
51 Ibidem, Sect. 1(6) 
52 Ibidem, Sect. 6(5), Let. A 
53 Ibidem, Sect. 6(7), Let. A specifies that for the purpose of this subsection “bill of lading”, “sea waybill” and 
“ship’s delivery order” have the same meaning as in the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992. 
54 Ibidem, Sect. 6(6), Let. A. 
55 Ibidem, Sect, 6(6), Let. B 
56 Explanatory Notes to: Contract (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999. Available at  
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199899/cmbills/118/en/99118x--.htm Last accessed 31/10/2015.
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2.2.4 The Clause interaction with the main conventional international sources of 
Maritime Law 
 
Once the characteristic of the Himalaya clause have been framed, the naturally following 
question concerns how its interaction with sources of international law works. Among the 
many people involved in the shipping business, the subjects with higher chance of causing 
damage or loss to the cargo are the one physically involved in the handling of it. It is im-
portant therefore understanding their position with regards of the international conventions.
  
As far as the Hague-Visby Rules are concerned, the changes introduced in 1968 imple-
mented a protection system for servants and agents of the carrier by extending to them the 
same defences allowed to the carrier57. When identifying the beneficiaries of said exten-
sion, an interpretative problem originated from the reading of the text in both its official 
languages58. The French text mentions the preposés whilst the English one talks about 
servants and agents other than expressly excluding independent contractors59. The doctrine 
normally consider part of the servants/agents category any worker in a contractual relation-
ship with the carrier and those who, despite not being contractually bound to the carrier, are 
still part of his structure. Typical examples are the master and the crew: often they are hired 
by the shipowner who does not necessarily coincide with the person of the carrier60. One 
possible issue arising when interpreting the text comes from the definition of “agents”: In 
some countries, agents are by definition an independent contractor61 therefore the applica-
tion of said rule might produce broadly different outcomes depending on the jurisdiction 
where the action has been introduced. Insofar, there is no telling or bounding case law on 
how to interpret the categories mentioned by the English version.   
                                                 
 
57 Hague-Visby Rules, Art. 4-bis (4). The benefit applies to the third parties only as far as they acted in per-
formance of their duty and the conduct has not been grossly negligent or wilfully aimed to cause the damage.  
58 English and French are the official languages of the amendments. 
59 Hague-Visby Rules, Art. 4-bis (2) 
60 This represents a normal situation in case of time charters  
61 G. Treitel & F. Reynolds, Carver on Bills of Lading 3rd Ed., 2012. P. 758 
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Another important parameter to take under consideration is the period of responsibility: the 
actions covered by the extended benefits must have a connection with the performing of the 
contractual obligations therefore they must take place in said time-frame. The Hague-Visby 
Rules system consists on the above discussed “tackle-to-tackle” period: the discipline ex-
cludes any liability protection for damage arising before the loading of the cargo and its 
discharge from the vessel and the same limit applying for the carrier must be extended to 
third parties. The parties also have the possibility of adopting a more stringent liability re-
gime: it follows that the freedom of contract allows the parties to approve anything they 
find suitable having regard only to the national legislation62.  
An interesting Italian case63 provided a great example of importance of the period of re-
sponsibility in connection of the triggering of the benefits granted by the Himalaya clause. 
The case dealt with an international sale from Genova (Italy) to Montreal (Canada). A Ca-
nadian carrier was then appointed for the transport of the goods. The bill of lading included 
a specific clause that made the Hague Rules applicable to the shipping. It also specified that 
“the carrier shall be under no liability whatsoever for loss of or damage to the goods, how-
soever occurring, when such loss or damage arises prior to loading on or subsequently to 
discharging from the vessel”. Another important fact is that, under specific request of the 
Shipper, the parties agreed so that the booking of the dock for the loading and the handling 
of the cargo had to be considered part of the fee paid to the carrier. The first instance judge, 
the Tribunale di Genova, considering the said operations were included in the carrier’s con-
tractual obligations and, having him delegated a stevedoring company for the performance, 
considering it a sub-contractor, allowed the latter to benefit of the protections granted by 
the Himalaya clause64. The Court of Appeal, moving from the material reference to the 
Hague Rules discipline, defined the period of responsibility as tackle-to-tackle therefore 
excluding the applicability of the Himalaya clause to protect the terminal operator company 
since the damage caused by its activities, arose before the loading of the goods, therefore 
before the starting of the contract.  
                                                 
 
62 Hague-Visby Rules, Art. 5 
63 Corte D’Appello di Genova (2003), Zurich International v Terminal Contenitori 
64 A. Antonini, La Responsabilità degli operatori del trasporto Case history and case law, 2008. P. 116 
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National legislations can bring to the table specific sets of rules to discipline the position of 
third parties. A typical example is the French Act that protects stevedores by granting them 
















3 A new international conventional source of law, the Hamburg 
Rules: the changes to liability in carriage of goods by sea and 
the influence on Scandinavian Maritime Law. 
3.1 The Hamburg Rules: a new conventional discipline for the international 
maritime shipping market. 
 
During the end of the 70s, emerging countries started campaigning for a change on the dis-
cipline established by the Hague-Visby Rules: the third world countries united and inter-
vened in order to increase the protection of the shippers interests65.: the Harter Act com-
promise, clear characterizing trait of the Hague Rules, was considered insufficient to pro-
tect them.  
In 1970 the UNCTAD66 a study of Bill of Lading was made and the following year, the 
UNICTRAL67 was established. The goal was to harmonise the international rules of trading 
in order to facilitate, and therefore increase, the volume of exchanges between the two 
sides of the world. Five years after, in 1976, the draft of the Hamburg Rules was finally 
ready and in 1978, during a conference, The UN Convention on the Carriage of Goods by 
Sea was then settled. As XXX points out: it finally dealt with the problems in terms of 
“economic warfare” between cargo and carrier and between traditional maritime States and 
developing world68.  
3.1.1 The changes on the Carrier’s duties from the Hague-Visby Rules regime 
 
Despite the best intentions of the parties involved in solving the problems brought about by 
the Hague Rules, the results has been seen by many negatively as the changes exacerbated 
                                                 
 
65 A. Rodriguez Palacios, Op Cit.., P. 28 
66 United Nations Commission for Trade and Development 
67 United Nations Commission for International Trade Law 
68 S. R. Mandelbaum. Creating Uniform Worldwide Liability Standards for Sea Carriage of Goods Under the 
Hague, COGSA, Visby and Hamburg Conventions, in University of Denver Transportation Law Journal, 
1996. P. 482 
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the problems creating conflicts between the two sets of rules69. The first that has to be 
pointed out is the change brought about by the Hamburg rules on the period of responsibil-
ity of the contractual carrier. In the Hague Rules, as discussed above, the period of respon-
sibility for the carrier coincides with the physically possession of the goods: the so-called 
“tackle to tackle rule”70. Based on this system, the carrier is not liable for damage that oc-
curs before and after the goods crossed the vessel’s side71. The Visby amendments have 
brought no substantial change to this discipline72.   
The Hamburg Rules introduced a major change: the period resulted expanded73  as it did 
not just start with the crossing of the vessel but with a more generic moment of “taking 
over  the goods”74. On the other end of the voyage, the mere discharge did not end it: the 
carrier liberates himself by risks only with the delivery of the goods to different possible 
recipients75. 
In the following paragraphs, we briefly analyse the main changes occurred to the Carrier’s 
main duties.  
 
3.1.1.1.1 The duty to provide a Seaworthy ship 
 
The Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, as presented above, expressly set the duty for the carrier to 
provide a seaworthy vessel to execute the contractual performance76.  The Hamburg Rules 
do not dedicate a specific provision for the duty of seaworthiness but instead, they establish 
a general duty not to negligently damage the goods. It follows that, based on the principle 
                                                 
 
69 A. Rodriguez Palacios, Op Cit., P.32 
70 Hague-Visby Rules, Art. I (e) states: “carriage of goods covers the period from the time when the goods are 
loaded on to the time they are discharged from the ship”. 
71A. Rodriguez Palacios, Op Cit., P. 49 
72Hague-Visby Rules, Art. 1 (e) states that: “Carriage of goods covers the period from the time when the 
goods are loaded on to the time when they are discharged from the ship”. 
73 S. R. Mandelbaum, Op Cit., P. 496 
74 Hamburg Rules, Art. 4 (1) 
75 Ibidem, Art. 4 (2), presents different possible scenarios such as the handing over to a designated consignee 
or to third parties designated by applicable law or regulations. 
76 Hague-Visby Rules, Art. III (1), let. A 
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of diligence, providing an unseaworthy vessel would represent a breach of the carrier’s 
duty therefore capable of triggering the liability unless, of course, the carrier can prove that 
he acted diligently77.    
Another important consequence of this change is that the duty of diligence is not limited to 
the time before the starting of the voyage78 but it operates for the whole period of responsi-
bility.  
 
3.1.1.1.2 The duty to not Operate Deviations 
 
As described above, the Hague-Visby Rules were allowing the carrier to take a deviation 
only if considered reasonable (e.g. saving human lives). The Hamburg Rules do not take 
position on the matter but, basing the judgment on the general principle of diligent acting, it 
logically follows that any deviation based on a reasonable choice should not be considered 
to integrate the requirements of negligence and, therefore, the carrier should be excused 
and protected from liability79. It is also worth noticing that, despite not directly mentioning 
deviations, the Hamburg Rules provide protection for the carrier in cases  where “loss, 
damage or delay in delivery resulted from measures to save life or from reasonable 
measures to save property at sea”80.  
 
3.1.1.1.3 The duty of Good Care of the cargo transported 
 
No major changes occurred on the taking care of cargo aspect: the carrier is reliable for any 
loss unless he proves that “he, his servants or agents took all measures that could reasona-
bly be required to avoid the occurrence and its consequences”81. As for the duration of the 
                                                 
 
77 P. Delebecque, Op Cit.., P. 87 
78 Hague-Visby Rules, Art. III (1) 
79 R. Force, Op Cit., P. 2069 
80 Hamburg Rules, Art.5 (6) 
81 Ibidem, Art 5 (1) 
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responsibility, as described above, it has furtherly been extended compared to the previous-
ly adopted tackle-to-tackle principle. One big difference between the two regimes lay on 
the liability for delay disciplines. The Hague-Visby Rules, not expressly providing an ad 
hoc norm, solved the issue by holding the carrier liable for all the damage occurred for the 
unjustified delay on delivery. There is no trace of remedies to recover economic loss mere-
ly due to the delay itself: as discussed above, only if the delay caused a damage on the 
goods it could have been considered a breach on the duty of “carefully and properly” han-
dle them.   
The Hamburg rules tackle the issue. A new norm is introduced in order to define what de-
lay constitutes: the situation in which “the goods have not been delivered at the port of dis-
charge provided […] within the time expressly agreed upon or […], within the time which 
it would be reasonable to require of a diligent carrier, having regard to the circumstances of 
the case”82.  
 
3.1.2 Changes on Exclusion and Limitation of liability rights of the Carrier  
 
Major changes occurred to the limitation and exclusion of liability system in the Hamburg 
rules. Unlike the Hague-Visby Rules, the new convention does not possess a list of excep-
tions83 such as act of God or act of War etc. The Hamburg rules, instead, rotates entirely 
around the duty of diligence: after a specific evaluation of the factual events, liability is 
deemed triggered only in case the carrier did not take every reasonable measures to avoid 
the damage84. Despite the lack of a dedicated catalogue of exceptions, the carrier is not 
deprived of defences in comparison with the Hague-Visby Rules as long as he acts diligent-
ly and he is capable of proving it.  
In the next paragraphs the exemptions for faulty navigational management and fire changes 
will be briefly  analysed.  
                                                 
 
82 Hamburg Rules, Art 5 (2) 
83 Hague-Visby Rules, Art. IV (2) 
84 Sze Ping Fat, Carrier's Liability Under the Hague, Hague-Visby and Hamburg Rules, 2002. P. 99 
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3.1.2.1 The Nautical Fault and Management of the Ship exemption 
 
The change occurred to the managerial and nautical exemptions introduced by the Hague-
Visby Rules85 is the most relevant modification brought about by the Hamburg Rules. This 
specific exception, just like the entire catalogue present on the document signed in Brussels 
in 1924, has been removed: no trace is left. The liability is therefore, just like mentioned in 
the previous paragraph, established on the basis of diligence. Every event caused by the 
carrier, his servant or agents negligence will trigger liability unless he can prove that he, or 
whom he is responsible for, has taken, as art. 5 (1) states, “all measures that could reasona-
bly be required to avoid the occurrence and its consequences”.  
 
3.1.2.2 The Fire damage exemption 
 
Similarly to the general prescriptions for liability, the rule for fire has been changed and 
based on diligence. Unlike the other exceptions, removed from the convention, the one for 
damage caused by fire is expressly disciplined by the Hamburg rules. The main difference 
with the other liability regimes lays on the burden of proof: in case of fire, liability is trig-
gered if “[…] the claimant proves that the fire arose from fault or neglect on the part of the 
carrier, his servants or agents”86. Therefore, it is the cargo owner that has to claim and 
prove the lack of diligence on the carrier’s (and those whom he is responsible for) acting. 
The damage might not only be due to the fire but also by the “measures that could reasona-
bly be required to put out the fire and avoid or mitigate its consequence”87. 
Lastly, the Rules give right to any of the two parties to ask and obtain “a survey in accord-
ance with shipping practices […]” in order to determine “[…] the cause and circumstances 
of the fire”88.  
                                                 
 
85 Hague-Visby Rules, Art. 4 (2) A 
86 Hamburg Rules, Art. 5 (4) A (I) 
87 Ibidem, Art. 5 (4) A (II) 
88 Ibidem, Art. 5 (4) B 
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3.1.3 Concluding Remarks: The Hamburg Rules limits and their interaction with 
the Himalaya clause. 
 
The Hamburg rules, like discussed above, moved from the necessity of the developing 
countries to grant more protection to the shippers’ interests. The changes on the limitation 
and exclusion of liability system have therefore been extensive: the carrier is no longer 
granted the privilege of the protection but, instead, the inversion of burden of proof forced 
him to prove that he always acted in a responsible and diligent way, which often is a very 
hard, if not impossible, task. He does not only answer for his personal conduct but as men-
tioned, also for the one of people performing work at his service. The only exception stand-
ing is the exception for damage caused by fire and the wrongful execution of measures to 
put it out.   
The outcome of these changes does not play in favour of the developing countries as, inso-
far, only 34 countries ratified the conventions and among those, the absence of great mari-
time shipping countries is easily noticeable: United States, United Kingdom to exemplify, 
have not ratified it nor had shown any interest on doing so. The main consequence of this 
division is the conflicts of laws applicable that can potentially cause several problems on 
all the parties involved in the shipping: the cargo interests, the carrier and the insurers. As 
John C. Moore observes89, there is no apparent reason for the United States or England to 
become a party to the Hamburg Rules. It may happen in case of the adhesion of a consist-
ently large number of their trading partners generating a need for uniformity of rules. 
As far as the relationship with the Himalaya clause is concerned, few changes are 
introduced in comparison with the Hague-Visby regime. Firstly, express exclusion of 
independent contractors leaves place to a different requirement: if the subject can prove 
that he was “working within the scope of its employment”90, he then receives the same 
protection granted to the carrier. It is worth mentioning that the French version of this 
article includes the word “mandataires”, which can be translated in English as 
                                                 
 
89 J. C. Moore, Hamburg Rules, in Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, 1978. P. 11 
90 Hamburg Rules, Art. 7(2) 
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“representative” of the carrier. The issues with establishing the extent of the agents 
category is rendered harder not only the existence by of six different version in as many 
different languages of the text, but mostly because of the different meaning that the word 
assumes in civil law systems in comparison with common law ones. Secondly, a new 
category of subjects, the “actual carrier”, has been introduced91: It consists on a subject 
who was entrusted the performance of the contract by the pcontractual carrier92. It must be 
highlighted that in any case, the original carrier remains responsible for the entire carriage 
and a vicarious liability system is triggered “for the acts and omissions of the actual carrier 
and of his servants and agents acting within the scope of their employment”93.  
As far as the period of responsibility is regarded, the system in the Hamburg Rules differs 
from the tackle-to-tackle to a considerable degree. As discussed in the previous chapter it 
includes the phases that precede the loading and the ones following the discharge: this 
constitutes the so-called port-to-port period94. The main requirement is that the operations, 
in order to be considered pursuant to the contract, take place in the port area. It follows that 
the protections brought about by the Hamburg Rules cannot generally be extended to 
independent contractors as the performing of their obligations usually takes place outside 
of the said area95.    
 
3.2 The Scandinavian solution: a compromise between the previous 
conventional rules.  
 
The Nordic countries, since 1973, adopted very similar legal solutions in the field of mari-
time law. Norway, just like the other Scandinavian countries, did not ratify the Hamburg 
                                                 
 
91 Ibidem, Art. 10(1) 
92 Ibidem, Art. 1(2) 
93 Ibidem 
94 Ibidem, Art. 1(6) defines a Contract of carriage by sea as “any contract whereby the carrier undertakes 
against payment of freight to carry goods by sea from one port to another […]”.  
95 Different scenario in Sze Ping-fat, Op Cit., P. 29. The author explains how, in case the independent con-
tractor’s activities take place in the port area and he can prove he was “working within the scope of its em-
ployment” pursuant to Art. 7(2), he can then benefits of the protections granted to the carrier. 
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Rules although, substantially, the rules did have a big impact in the Norwegian legal sys-
tem. The choice was, rather than accepting to introduce entirely the changes brought about 
by the Hamburg Rules, which could have led to countless conflicts of laws in a system that 
ratified the Hague-Visby Rules, to introduce the principles of the Hamburg Rules in the 
Nordic Maritime Code, “aligning as far as possible without having to derogate from the 
Hague-Visby Convention”96.   
It is worth mentioning that Norway, during the preparatory works in 1994, has decided to 
differentiate itself from the other Nordic partners creating the so-called “two track system”: 
the conventional rules apply only on international carriage, leaving domestic transports free 
to be differently regulated.  
 
3.2.1 The Basis of liability in Norwegian Maritime Law 
 
During the transportation of goods by sea different kinds of damage may arise: the cargo 
can be lost, damaged or simply delivered with delay, causing therefore an economic loss to 
the shipper. It is interesting to observe how the conventions described above have heavily 
influenced the Norwegian Maritime Code.  
The starting point for the liability rules is sect. 275: it imposes liability for any damage 
caused to the cargo by the carrier or the people whom he is responsible for. The burden of 
proof, like in the Hamburg Rules, lays on the carrier who has to prove that he, and the sub-
jects whom he is responsible for, acted in a reasonable way.  
The period of responsibility is disciplined by sect. 274 and follows the port-to-port system 
designed by the Hamburg Rules: it starts when the carrier receives the goods from the ship-
per and ends at the port of destination only after he has delivered or stored them according 
to the applicable rule97. 
                                                 
 
96 H. J. Bull, Op Cit., P. 281 
97 NMC, Sect. 274, 3rd paragraph, n. 1-2-3 
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As far as exclusions of liability are concerned, section 276 of the NMC follows the struc-
ture introduced by the Hague-Visby Rules98 providing two exceptions related to neglect in 
the navigation or management of the ship or fire. The only prerequisite consists in the “ini-
tial seaworthiness”: it appears clear from the wording of the section that, in case of initial 
unseaworthiness, the carrier looses the right to shielding himself against liability, regardless 
whether the causes that led to damage are connected with neglect on nautical operation and 
management of the ship or fire. Eliminating them was one of the goal of the creators of the 
Hamburg Rules but despite that, as the other Nordic States wished otherwise, the exemp-
tions have been maintained for international trades. Norway though, reserved different 
rules for Norwegian internal trade99 eliminating such exemptions. 
The action in order to recover the damage suffered is based on the contract of carriage: the 
cargo owner only needs to prove that the damage occurred during the period in which the 
goods were in the carrier’s custody. In order to do so, the normal procedure consists in 
comparing the state of the goods at delivery with the conditions described in the bill of lad-
ing. If a damage occurred, the burden of proof is then reverted: it will be on the carrier to 
prove that he and his servants acted reasonably100. 
 
3.2.2 Vicarious Liability in the Norwegian Maritime Code 
 
As described above, the people materially involved in the damage occurred to the cargo can 
hardly be identified with the carrier or his senior employees. Most frequently, the damage 
occurs on the field, during the actual transport or the loading and discharging of the goods. 
It follows that, without specific legal principles, the position of the carrier would result 
untouchable by the cargo interests’ claims. The NMC bases its solution of the problem on 
                                                 
 
98 Hague-Visby Rules, Art. 4.2 Let. A and B. See above, Paragraph 2.1.2 
99 NMC, Sect. 276, 3rd paragraph states “The present section shall not apply to contracts for carriage by sea in 
domestic trade in Norway”. 
100 An authoritative case confirming this is ND 1987.160 NCS NY DOLSØY: the Supreme Court established 
that, given the carrier was not capable of proving that the damage did not originate because of his servants’ 
fault, despite the claimant counterparty could not prove the opposite, he had to be held liable for the damage 
occurred. 
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sect. 151: “The Reder101 shall be liable to compensate damage caused in the service by 
fault or neglect of the master, crew, pilot, thug or others performing work in service of the 
ship”. 
The peculiarity of this section is its open catalogue: on the first part, the norm states a list 
of employees for which the shipowner can be held liable, thereafter, it extends the liability 
for any negligent conduct made by anyone performing work in service of the ship. This 
leaves the interpreters with a problematic situation when it comes to apply the rule to a 
concrete case. Three different parameters were identified by the doctrine102 in order to 
solve the said difficulties: a brief analysis will follow in the next paragraphs. 
 
3.2.2.1 The legal relationship between the carrier and the person performing the work 
 
 
The first thing to be looked at when discussing vicarious liability is the existence of a con-
tract of employment between the shipowner and the person who actually performed the 
work. It is important to remind that the duration and the quality of the contractual perfor-
mances are not relevant for this scope. A first issue arises when the work performed does 
not have its basis on employment but, for example, consists on a performance obtained by 
an independent contractor. The examples can be multiple: towing, loading and discharging 
of the ship are the most common. This is the peculiarity of sect. 151: the shipowner can 
result liable for the work of people he has not direct control on. A typical example are the 
stevedores. The workers who physically perform the task of loading or discharging the 
goods from the vessel are usually hired by a stevedore company, which entered in a con-
tractual relationship with the carrier. It follows that there is no contractual relationship be-
tween the worker and the shipowner but according to sect. 151, being the worker “perform-
                                                 
 
101 The word Reder does not have an English equivalent. It refers to, according to the NMC preface, ”the 
person (or company) that runs the vessel for his or her own account, typically the owner or the demise char-
terer. Time charterers and voyage charterers are not considered “reders”. 
102 H. J. Bull, Op Cit., P. 177. The author refers to the work of the Norwegian jurist Sjur Braekhus 
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ing in service of the ship”, the shipowner is to be held liable for the results of his miscon-
duct.  
It is interesting to notice how the clause is as open as including the consequences of volun-
tary work if accepted by the shipowner despite the complete absence of any contractual or 
economically valuable relationship whatsoever. A good example is the case103 of a father 
who allowed his underage son to operate his boat: following a negligent accident, a third 
party was killed. Despite the young man was navigating entirely on his own, the father was 
nevertheless held liable. 
Lastly, it is important to highlight that liability goes as far as including personnel not even 
selected by the shipowner. Let us consider for example the compulsory port pilot. The 
shipowner has no say on the choice and has to accept the person sent by the authority in 
charge. Few examples from case law: the first, following an accident in 1963104, resulted in 
the State set free from liability for the grounding occurred as follow up of the pilot faulty 
performance. Another case105 in 1984 concerned a vessel that collided during a storm with 
a moored seaplane. The port authorities wrongfully disposed the anchor positioning caus-
ing the collision but the Court held unanimously that, being mooring performed in service 
of the vessel and being an element of maritime activities, the shipowner had to be held lia-
ble as the port authority must be considered among the subjects covered by sect. 151.  
 
3.2.2.2 The nature of the service perfomed 
 
Not any work or action can trigger liability: the performance must indeed have a connec-
tion with a particular ship and be in its service. Being part of an employment contract, as 
we could see above, is not a necessary condition but, at the same time, it would not consti-
tute a sufficient condition to trigger the liability just by itself either. A common example 
often used by the doctrine is the employed seaman on board but off-duty: his acting cannot 
                                                 
 
103 ND 1973.334 NSC 
104 ND 1963.34 NSC PRINCE CHARLES 
105 ND 1984.122 NSC  
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be considered in direct performance of a service for the ship therefore, it follows that the 
damage he may cause would not trigger vicarious liability.  
The most famous used exemplification on the matter comes from a case106 of 1914: during 
the celebration of the New Year’s Eve, the first mate decided to fire a rocket but it acci-
dentally caused a fire on a nearby building. The Shipowner escaped liability as the acting 
of the officer was clearly outside of the scope of his service for the vessel. The bottom line 
is that the shipowner must respond for damages caused by his employees within the limits 
of ordinary negligence: any extraordinary act, such the firing of a rocket, cannot possibly 
be foreseen and, therefore, should not lead to consequences for the employer.  
 
3.2.2.3 Different categories of assistants covered by vicarious liability 
 
Along with the subjects expressly named by sect. 151, the master, the crew, the pilot and 
thugs, other typical subjects under the shipowner liability are the longshoremen and other 
assistants working while the ship is in port107. Among those, any subject involved in the 
loading, discharging and weighting of the goods. Shipyards, repairers, consultants miscon-
ducts may trigger the shipowner liability too: the decisive parameter is always the nature of 










                                                 
 
106 ND 1914.159 NCC SARDINIA 
107 H. J. Bull, Op Cit., P. 182 
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4 Rotterdam Rules 
 
The Rotterdam Rules108 represents the latest international convention on carriage of goods. 
The most important difference when compared with the previous Rules is that, unlike the 
Hamburg or Hague-Visby ones, this catalogue of norms aims to discipline multimodal 
transport109. The changes brought about are designed to discipline new duties and liability 
for the carrier in line with the new kind of carriage and its door-to-door system110.  
 
4.1 The changes on the Carrier’s Duty from the Hague-Visby Rules regime 
 
There are multiple differences between the Rotterdam Rules and the Hague-Visby Rules. 
After a brief analysis of the two regimes, it is easy to observe how the new rules, rather 
than radically change the pre-existent ones, introduced new additional duties. In the next 
paragraphs, a specific analysis of the modifications will be provided. It is important to un-
derline that, despite the innovative character of the convention and the interesting new fea-
tures brought such as the discipline for the electronic alternatives to transport documents, 
the Rotterdam Rules did not achieve the desired success: the convention will only enter 
into force a year after the 20th State ratified it. As for now, 24 countries signed it, but only 
three111 of them ratified it. 
 
4.1.1 The duty to provide a Seaworthy ship 
 
                                                 
 
108 United Nation Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea 
2008 
109 With Multimodal carriage of goods we refer to a contract of carriage performed with at least two means of 
transport. 
110 T. Nikaki, The carrier's duties under the Rotterdam rules: Better the Devil You Know?, in Tulane Mari-
time Law Vol-35 N.1, 2010. P. 7 
111 Congo, Spain and Togo. Official source  UNCITRAL 
 http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/transport_goods/rotterdam_status.html last accessed 
31/10/2015 
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As discussed in the first chapter, under the Hague-Visby Rules regime the carrier is obliged 
to provide a seaworthy ship for the performance of the contract of carriage. Whilst the 
Hamburg Rules did not expressly mention a specific duty on the carrier providing instead a 
general obligation to perform the contract obligations with due diligence, the Rotterdam 
Rules, bring back the express imposition of said duty112. Instead of a general duty, art. 14 
provides a detailed catalogue of obligations113:  
1) The ship must be made seaworthy. 
2) The ship must be equipped, supplied and manned not only at the start of the voyage, 
but throughout the end of the performance of the contract of carriage. 
3) The ship must also be cargo-worthy, this means the holds must be rendered clean 
and safe for receiving, keeping and transporting the goods object of the contract un-
til their final delivery.  
 
Said requirements are not to be viewed in a static way: the needed conditions change ac-
cordingly with the contract of carriage, the route to be followed and the goods to be trans-
ported. It follows that the requirements will be fulfilled if the structure of the vessel, her 
equipment, the crew and her holds are capable to overcome the perils and conditions that 
are reasonably expectable from the voyage in question.  
It is important to highlight the fact that said duties are not applicable to the entire duration 
of the multimodal transport, but exclusively to the maritime part of it.  
As far as the period of responsibility is concerned, art. 14 clearly extends it in comparison 
with the Hague-Visby Rules that prescribed only a duty of “initial” seaworthiness. The 
letter of the norm does not leave space for interpretative doubts: “The carrier is bound 
before, at the beginning of, and during the voyage by sea“, it follows that the obligation 
under this new regime has to be considered continuous114 during the transport by sea. In 
                                                 
 
112 Rotterdam Rules, Art. 14 
113 T. Nikaki, The obligations of carriers to provide seaworthy ships and exercise care, in A New convention 
for the carriage of goods by sea – the Rotterdam Rules, 2009. P. 102 
114 Ibidem, P. 105. The Author underlines how without this change, the regime would not be compatible with 
the new modern safety regulations introduced after the implementation of the Hague-Visby Rules, such as the 
ISM Code, that impose the duty of adopting maintenance procedures for the vessel.  
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case the required condition changes during the performing of the contractual obligation for 
whatsoever reason, the duty persists and the carrier will be obliged to restore of the initial 
seaworthiness. Different critiques arose on how this duty would represent a massive in-
creasing of burden for the carrier, which would have likely caused a consequential increase 
of fees. In addition, granting the needed repair in certain situation, for example while sail-
ing in the middle of the ocean, would be physically impossible. The solution lays on the 
right interpretation of the norm: it does not impose an absolute duty, but it obliges the car-
rier to take any reasonable measure in order to solve the arisen issue115. 
As a final note, it is worth mentioning the difference between English common law systems 
(and the Scandinavian system, specifically the Norwegian Maritime Code, discussed in the 
previous chapter) and the rule concerning the consequences of unseaworthiness. In English 
Law, just like in Norwegian Law116, the lack of seaworthiness renders the damage imputa-
ble on the carrier, preventing him from to excluding or limiting his liability. In the Rotter-
dam Rules regime117, the cargo interests must prove the nexus between the unseaworthiness 
and the damage arisen to the goods, the carrier is offered the change to avoid liability by 
proving that he exercised due diligence to comply with his obligations.  
 
4.1.2 The duty to not operate Deviations  
 
The regime of liability, as far as deviations are concerned, has been deeply modified due to 
the massive improvements achieved by navigational instruments implemented in modern 
vessels. Unlike the previous regimes, which allowed only reasonable deviations, art. 24 of 
the Rotterdam Rules expressly establishes that operating a change of the route, even if 
pursuant to the applicable law it constitutes a contractual breach, it does not negate the 
                                                 
 
115 Ibidem, P. 106 
116 NMC, Sect. 276, 2nd paragraph 
117 Rotterdam Rules, Art. 17, (5), Let. A 
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carrier his exlusion and limitation of liability rights118. The only exceptions presented by 
the norm itself are the cases pursuant to art. 61 of the Convention: said norm referes to 
breaches caused by wilful or grossly negligent acting committed by the person claiming 
exclusion or limitation of liability.  
 
4.1.3 The duty of Good Care of the cargo transported  
 
The Rotterdam Rules provide a quite extensive catalogue of specific obligations of the 
carrier relating to the cargo: he is obliged to “properly and carefully receive, load, handle, 
stow, carry, keep, care for, unload and deliver the goods“119. The main difference between 
art. III r2 of the Hague-Visby rules and the above quoted Art. 13 consists on the addition of 
two new duties: the carrier is indeed obliged to receive and to deliver them to the contrac-
tual consignee. The main consequence of this change consists in the extension of the period 
of responsibility concerning the goods from the tackle-to-tackle to door-to-door system: the 
cargo has to reach the established place of delivery rather than the place of destination. The 
reasoning behind this extension is to include every parts of the carriage which form the 
multimodal transport: it follows that unlike the duty of providing a seaworthy vessel, the 
duty of care of the cargo is not limited to the maritime part of the carriage. It is important to 
highlight that the duty only applies to the cargo operation the carrier undertook to perform 
under the contract in question120.  
As far as clauses such as Fio or Fios121 are concerned, the only precondition prescribed by 
the Rotterdam Rules consists in having the agreement inserted or referred to in the contract 
of carriage. 
                                                 
 
118 D. Rhidian Thomas, An analysis of the liability regime of carriers and maritime performing partners, in A 
New convention for the carriage of goods by sea – the Rotterdam Rules, 2009. P. 68 
119 Rotterdam Rules, Art. 13, 1st paragraph  
120 T. Nikaki, The obligations of carriers to provide seaworthy ships and exercise care. P. 93 
121 They consist in typical contractual clauses through which the parties of the contract modify the standard 
responsibilities and costs for the handling of the cargo. The first consists in Free in and Out, the second Free 
in and out stowed, and both cause the risks and costs of the operations to the cargo interests. 
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Finally, it is interesting to note that according to art 12, 1st paragraph of the Rules, the Con-
vention will be applied only if the carrier receives the goods from the shipper with the pur-
pose of initiating the carriage. Any other purposes, such as storage of the goods awaiting 
for further instructions, will not trigger the Rotterdam Rules but, instead, the relevant pro-
visions of the applicable national law.  
 
4.2 The changes on the exclusion and limitation of liability rights of the 
Carrier and the period of responsibility  
 
As discussed in the previous chapters, the catalogue of exceptions introduced by the 
Hague-Visby Rules have been sensibly modified by the Hamburg Rules. The Rotterdam 
Rules inverted the trade and presented a list of exceptions122 that resembles the one in the 
Hague-Visby catalogue. The revolutionary aspect of the 1968 Convention though, 
consisting in eliminating the exemption for liability arising as consequence of navigational 
errors of the master and crew, has been confirmed by the Rotterdam Rules.  
As far as the fire exemption is concerned123, an intersting change occurred: pursuant to art. 
17, 3rd paragraph, let. F, the carrier is released wholly or partly from liability if he proves 
alternatively either that the damage occurred despite the absence of fault on his behalf, or if 
fire on the ship was the cause or contributed to create the damage de quo. The 5th paragraph 
of the same article also underlines that “the carrier is also liable [...] for all or part of the 
loss, damage, or delay if [...] the claimant proves that the loss, damage, or delay was or 
was probably caused by or contributed to by (i) the unseaworthiness of the ship; (ii) the 
improper crewing, equipping, and supplying of the ship; or (iii) the fact that the holds or 
other parts of the ship in which the goods are carried, or any containers supplied by the 
carrier”. The privity of the carrier on the causation of damage is no longer required.  
                                                 
 
122 Rotterdam Rules, Art. 17 (3), Let. A - O 
123 Ibidem, Art. 17 (3), Let. F 
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The Rules are based on a door-to-door system that disciplines the multimodal carriage of 
goods in which at least one of the means of transport has to be maritime124, it follows that 
the period of responsibility starts when the carrier, or a performing party, receives the 
goods and ends when the delivery takes place125. As we deal with a multimodal carriage, it 
may happen that the port of discharge does not coincide with the place of delivery because 
an additional transport might then be required. As far as the party involved in the carriage 
by sea, the period of responsibility is limited between the arrival of the cargo at the estab-
lished loading port and the discharging at the agreed destination126. It is worth mentioning 
that in order to the convention to apply, the port of loading or discharge must be a signatory 
State127. 
 
4.3 Rotterdam Rules and Himalaya clause: how do they relate ? 
 
One very important innovation of the Rotterdam Rules consists in abadonement of the 
servant/agent and indipendent contractor categories through the introduction of the “per-
forming party”128. It consists on a person, other than the contractual carrier, who performs 
the obligations connected to the contract of carriage. Among these subjects, a specific legal 
regime is reserved for the maritime operator who is defined as a person who performs con-
tractual obligations “during the period between the arrival of the goods at the port of load-
ing […] and their departure from the port of discharge”.129 The most important conse-
quence is that, unlike other performing parties, their activity must take place within the 
ports and their liability is disciplined by art. 19, which means they are entitled the benefit 
of the same rights of excluding or limiting their liabilities granted to the carrier. The main 
consequence of this new rule is that terminal operators position is now covered by the con-
                                                 
 
124 Ibidem, Art. 1, 1st paragraph 
125 Rotterdam Rules, Art. 12, 1st paragraph 
126 Ibidem, Art. 19, 1st paragraph, Let. B 
127 Ibidem, Art. 19, 1st paragraph, Let. A 
128 Ibidem, Art. 1, 6th paragraph 
129 Ibidem, Art. 1, 7th paragraph. See D. Rhidian Thomas, Op Cit., P. 57 
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ventional rules without the need of an ad hoc clause such as the Himalaya one. It is im-
portant to highlight that the aggregated liability of all the sued subjects, carrier and various 
maritime performing parties, “shall not exceed the overall limits of liability under this 
Convention”130, therefore establishing a joint and several liability among them: it clearly 
differs from the previous regimes that only extended to other subjects the defences granted 
to the carrier.  
The carrier liability extends to any breach of contractual obligations due to fault or neglect, 
by act or omission, of any performing parties and their employees, the vessel crew and 
master and any person who acts upon request of the carrier or under his supervision131.  
Very different is the position of non-maritime performing parties as the Rotterdam Rules 
do not provide specific defences and direct claims can be brought against them, their 
position is very simimalar to the one of indipendent contractors under the Hague-Visby 
Rules and the regime to be applied is the one governed by relevant national or international 
norms. It is important to observe though, that nothing is established against the possibility 
of limiting their liability through contractual terms agreed by the parties such as the 
Himalaya clause: the provisions pursuant art. 79 do not mention the land performing parties 
among the subjects beneficiaries of contractual terms to restrict/increase liability that have 










                                                 
 
130 Ibidem, Art. 20, 2nd paragraph 
131 Ibidem, Art. 18 
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5 Concluding Remarks 
 
The main scope of the rules analysed is to ensure that the economic burden caused by the 
perils of the voyage at sea are fairly distributed between the cargo interests and the carrier. 
The evolution of the liability system has been continuous and very adaptive: it started from 
a “strict liability” regime, whereas liability is triggered despite the quality of the conduct of 
the carrier, to eventually reach a complicated and detailed set of rules based entirely on 
fault or neglect.  As discussed above, the change started within the private market practice 
context where the carriers started incorporating specific contractual terms in order to limit 
or exclude their liabilities. The use and abuse of these clauses led to a clear unbalance be-
tween the two parties at the end and an orchestrated international intervention to obtain 
clear and fair rules was then felt necessary. The swinging between the two sides of the 
spectrum then eventually resulted into the first international convention signed in Bruxelles 
in 1924 which established the first set of internationally bounding rules for contracts of 
carriage by sea evidenced by the emission of a bill of lading. 
The main aspects of the new liability regime consist in the introduction of a catalogue of 
not-amendable duties and a liability for fault that is triggered by a conduct that constitutes 
their breach. The core duties consist in providing a seaworthy ship before the start of the 
contractual voyage, care of the cargo transported and no deviations from the established 
route. It is worth reminding that the fault on the carrier behalf is presumed, all the cargo 
interests has to prove is that the damage occurred while the goods were in custody of the 
carrier: he then bears the burden of proving he acted reasonably in respect of his contractu-
al duties.  
Along with this catalogue, another one including normally expectable perils at sea has been 
created thus establishing a list of possible events that exclude the triggering of liability for 
the carrier. The ratio, once again, is to equally share the venture risks between the two par-
ties of the contract of carriage. 
Relevant issues and challenges remained unsolved. Among all, the most important ones 
concerned certain aspects of vicarious liability, therefore the liability triggered by damages 
caused by the conduct of parties third to the contract of carriage. The most typical example 
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is the liability triggered by the dock operators hired to perform the handling of the cargo, 
but also the position of contractual parties who perform in service of the ship like shipyard 
workers engaged in repairing the vessel, represented an unsolved issue. The market prac-
tice came to a solution through the so-called Himalaya clause: the scope was to protect the 
third parties to a contract from the cargo interests tortious claims establishing a direct 
channelling of liability toward the carrier/employer. Courts enforced such clauses and their 
use widely spread among the market operators.  
The Hamburg Rules, created as result of the developing countries pressure, brought about a 
more cargo interests friendly system trying to eliminate outdated privileges on behalf of the 
carriers established by the Hague-Visby Rules such as the exclusion of liability for naviga-
tional and ship management errors. It is interesting to observe and analyse how different 
legal systems, such as the Norwegian one, have adopted a set of rules which represent the 
compromise between the various rules established by international conventional sources 
and the contractual terms invented by the market practice.  
Finally, as far as the Rotterdam Rules are concerned, it is possible to see how they clearly 
represent the most advanced attempt to uniform the rules of the market with a special re-
gard to the technological changes that occurred. It cannot be ignored that the Hague-Visby 
Rules, which still are the main source of regulation in the shipping by sea business, despite 
their amendments, are very outdated. The rules are indeed based on a level of technology 
which made voyages far more dangerous than how they are nowadays. That justified the 
favourable conditions set for the carrier but certain benefits appear outdated and unfair in 
light of the changes and developments reached by the nautical industry. A clear example is 
the discipline on deviations: nowadays, changing route or simply deviating from it does not 
appear to be such a dangerous choice for the carrier thanks to the navigational instruments 
employed on board. The new rules also regulated the positions of subjects for whom the 
carrier is vicariously liable for, in fact eliminating the need, as far as maritime transport is 
concerned, for contractual terms such as the Himalaya clause. The new system does not 
regulate the mere transport by sea but, inspired by the new means of carriage of goods, it 
regulates the entire venture: this mean starting from the delivery from the shipper, and con-
cluding with the final delivery to the consignee, no matter how many different segments of 
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different nature of transport are involved. The aim, when discussing de jure condendo, 
should be the harmonization of the multimodal transport rules established with the Rotter-
dam Convention with the other rules established for other unimodal conventions. Another 
obstacle to be tackled is the requirement of the sea leg of transport in order to trigger the 
applicability of the rules. Despite these facts, having the Rotterdam Rules ratified and 
therefore coming into force would be a tremendous innovation, as they would represent the 
first and only international set of regulations on the matter of multimodal transport.  
As far as vicarious liability is concerned, the regime of the Rotterdam Rules only leaves a 
loophole in its otherwise very well designed structure: the liability for non-maritime per-
forming parties. A loophole that can easily be fixed through the adoption of specific con-
tractual terms similar to the Himalaya clause, use of which is not forbidden by the rules 
themselves. 
The evolution of vicarious liability has seen different changes. Protecting the position of 
those subjects hired and working under direct control of the carrier is a necessity for the 
market. This work has shown how the absence of a detailed discipline and the technical 
limits showed by the Hague-Visby Rules has caused the spreading of private contractual 
solutions whilst the scarce success of the following conventional rules has failed the expec-
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